Lebanon: How Hezbollah is rising from the ashes

Iran's resilience in the face of the US-Israeli war machine and its ability to sustain an asymmetric conflict are not the only elements that have caught analysts off guard in the current Middle East escalation. Another equally unexpected factor has been Hezbollah's battlefield performance, despite being widely considered weakened by both allies and adversaries. Following the decapitation of its leadership during the last war (8 October 2023 - 27 November 2024), and after suffering heavy losses - nearly 4,000 fighters killed and thousands more wounded, particularly during the final 66 days of the conflict - the group appeared to be on an irreversible path of decline. Its apparent inaction during the 15 months following the 27 November ceasefire, despite 10,000 documented violations by Israel according to the United Nations - violations that reportedly killed nearly 400 of its members - further reinforced this perception. However, Hezbollah's decision to open the Lebanese front on 2 March, combined with the scale of its firepower, the resilience of its ground units in direct clashes with Israeli forces, the adoption of new battlefield tactics, and the effectiveness of its command-and-control structures, has rapidly challenged the narrative of decline. It is clear that Hezbollah has rebuilt its military capabilities, retired Lebanese General Elias Farhat told Middle East Eye. This assessment is echoed by Israeli sources. In a report broadcast on Channel 12 on 4 April, Northern Command chief Major General Rafi Milo said in a recorded closed-door conversation with residents of Kibbutz Misgav Am that the Israeli army had been surprised by Hezbollah's rehabilitation capabilities. Surprising rehabilitation capabilities Developments on the ground appear to support the thesis of a Hezbollah resurgence. Israeli sources state that the group launched more than 5,000 rockets, missiles, and drones at Israel between 2 March and 30 March. The Qatari TV channel Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, citing Israeli estimates, reports that Hezbollah could sustain a rate of 200 rocket and drone launches per day for up to five months. The pace of attacks peaked on 26 March, with more than 600 projectiles launched at Israel within 24 hours, according to The Jerusalem Post. 'It is clear that Hezbollah has rebuilt its military capabilities' - Retired Lebanese General Elias Farhat Along the southern Lebanese front - stretching 120km from the Mediterranean coast to the foothills of the occupied Syrian Golan - Israeli losses in military personnel and equipment have mounted for relatively limited gains. Eleven Israeli soldiers have been killed and more than 300 wounded since the start of the war. Hezbollah says it destroyed 136 Merkava tanks and 26 additional military vehicles. After more than a month of offensive operations, Israeli forces continue to face fierce resistance. Advances of 3-7km in certain sectors have not provided the decisive advantage needed to achieve Israel's stated objective of establishing a buffer zone extending from the border to the Litani River. At this stage of the invasion - carried out by five divisions and several elite regiments - Israel controls only 208.5 sq km, roughly 2 percent of Lebanese territory. Some of these areas remain contested, with Israeli forces struggling to establish full control. Voices are now emerging within Israel calling for a scaling back of war objectives, advocating instead for a narrower buffer zone of around 3km. A third generation of commanders The military capabilities displayed in the current war indicate that immediately after the 2024 conflict, Hezbollah embarked on a large-scale effort to rebuild and reorganise its military structures, drawing lessons from its setbacks. The first vulnerability it sought to address was the infiltration of its human networks and communication systems by Israeli intelligence. The military and security apparatus has since been taken over by a third generation of commanders - aged between 30 and 40 - who have thoroughly restructured the organisation. The group has rebuilt its command-and-control chain and replaced fallen commanders. The operation was successful, said Elias Farhat. The new commanders are young, highly educated, and hold degrees in scientific and technical fields. Current engagements with the Israeli army show strong professional conduct and extensive military knowledge. To counter the systematic penetration of its intelligence and communication systems - which had enabled Israel to locate and assassinate many of its commanders during the previous war - Hezbollah now relies on handwritten notes, human couriers, and other low-signature communication methods. This may explain why, despite intense air strikes, Israeli forces have not yet succeeded in identifying and eliminating the new senior leadership. The previous territorial organisation of the southern front into three units - Badr, Nasr, and Azeez - remains in place. However, command structures have been significantly decentralised. Four levels of command have been established to prevent leadership gaps in the event of death, capture, or incapacitation. Hezbollah has reorganised its forces into small units and adopted a strategy of mobile defence, Farhat added. Rearmed and retrained Amal Saad, a leading Hezbollah specialist and author of Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion, has analysed the group's evolving combat doctrine. In a post on X, she described it as a return to hybrid warfare forms that predate the current conflict. What is being described today as a shift to smaller cells, lighter command links, mobile combat, and surprise attacks is simply a reversion to the Mughniyeh doctrine, which shaped the 2006 war, she wrote. Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah's former military commander, was assassinated in Damascus in 2008. The sustained rate of rocket and missile fire towards northern Israel suggests significant remaining firepower... Hezbollah appears to retain substantial stockpiles, including south of the Litani River The Mughniyeh model is based on dispersed forces organised into small units combining guerrilla-style mobility and tactical surprise with capabilities typically associated with conventional armies. Saad notes that this hybrid model was studied in US military manuals because it blurred the traditional distinction between regular and irregular warfare. The sustained rate of rocket and missile fire towards northern Israel suggests significant remaining firepower. Despite Israeli strikes and seizures by the Lebanese army, Hezbollah appears to retain substantial stockpiles, including south of the Litani River. Based on Israeli estimates prior to the 2024 war of 150,000 projectiles, and Israel's claim of having destroyed 70 percent of that arsenal, roughly 45,000 missiles would remain - enough to sustain operations for months, Farhat said. Observers have also noted the diversity of weaponry used. In addition to various versions of the Russian Kornet anti-tank missile, Hezbollah has introduced the Iranian Almas 2 and 3 systems. These anti-tank guided missiles can follow a lofted trajectory, enabling top-attack strikes that can bypass the Trophy active protection systems used on Israeli Merkava tanks. Reach and resilience On 18 March, Hezbollah launched a projectile towards Ashkelon, roughly 200km from the border, indicating possession of long-range, high-precision missiles - possibly of the Fattah type. The group has also fired surface-to-air missiles at least 10 times since the war began, including once against Israeli aircraft over Beirut's southern suburbs on 28 March, suggesting that its air defence units have been reconstituted. On 6 April, Hezbollah announced it had fired a missile at an Israeli naval vessel off the Lebanese coast. During the 2006 war, Hezbollah struck an Israeli Sa'ar-class vessel with a Chinese C-802 missile, killing at least four sailors. How Iran war will shape the future of Hezbollah and Israeli expansionism Read More » Unconfirmed reports suggest the group may now possess Russian supersonic Yakhont anti-ship missiles. Another challenge Hezbollah sought to overcome was the disruption of its Iran-Lebanon supply line following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime on 8 December 2024. It has partially mitigated this by relying on established smuggling networks along the Iraq-Syria and Syria-Lebanon borders. Damascus authorities have reported intercepting several recent attempts to smuggle weapons into Lebanon. Assessing Hezbollah's fighting strength remains difficult. The only official figure ever provided came from Hassan Nasrallah, who once said the group had 100,000 fighters. Last October, Hezbollah organised what it described as the world's largest scout gathering at Beirut's Sports City stadium, with 75,000 participants aged 6 to 17. A Lebanese security source told Middle East Eye that Hezbollah likely maintains around 35,000 well-trained active fighters and can mobilise up to 50,000 reservists. Sources close to the group indicated that by late December 2025, military commanders had informed Secretary-General Naim Qassem that reconstruction efforts were complete and that the Resistance is ready for a new confrontation. At the time, many analysts dismissed such claims as morale-boosting propaganda aimed at a fatigued support base. Developments on the battlefield now suggest otherwise. The Israeli plan B Unable to secure a decisive military breakthrough against Hezbollah, Israel appears to have shifted toward plan B: a strategy of widespread punitive strikes targeting not only predominantly Shia neighbourhoods but also areas with significant Sunni and Christian populations. On 8 April, only hours after the announcement of a ceasefire between the US and Iran, Israeli warplanes launched a wave of strikes described as unprecedented in scale, intensity and geographic reach. Roughly 100 raids carried out within 10 minutes left hundreds dead and wounded, according to Lebanese Health Minister Rakan Nasreddine. Follow Middle East Eye's live coverage of Israel's genocide in Gaza Several of the strikes hit Beirut proper, including mixed neighbourhoods and districts with a Sunni majority, marking a notable expansion in the campaign's scope. A message posted on X by the Israeli army's Arabic-language spokesperson Avichay Adraee points to a broader objective behind the escalation: widening internal fault lines by driving a wedge between Hezbollah and its support base, and more generally between the Shia movement and other Lebanese communities. That same logic appears to underpin the strike that killed a senior figure from the Christian Lebanese Forces and his wife in Ain Saadeh, on the northeastern outskirts of Beirut, on 6 April. Whether this strategy will deepen domestic divisions in Lebanon remains an open question. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. Hezbollah Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0